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NOTES
TEACHERS' STRIKEs - A NEW MILITANCY
"No public employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike, and
no employee organization shall cause, instigate, encourage, or condone a strike."
- New York's Taylor Law1
"One of the ways in which we test laws . . . and one of the ways in which
we change them in a democratic society, is to violate them openly... with a willing-
ness to take the consequences in the hope that we can mobilize public opinion and
public support to change those laws .... The court cannot legally tell anyone to
work if they do not want to work. This is not a slave state. It is a democracy."
- Albert Shanker, President,
New York City United Federation of Teachers2
"It is no answer to the problem of preventing strikes of government employees
to outlaw the 'strike' by legislation. These have proved unworkable and mostly
futile. If conditions become utterly intolerable public employees will quit en masse,
call it strike or otherwise."
-American Bar Association,
Section of Labor Relations Laws
I. Introduction
No one can deny that the teacher occupies a sphere of growing importance
in our rapidly-evolving society. Entrusted with the education and intellectual
formation of our nation's children, teachers are in a position to fashion thoughts
and ideas, goals and directions. "... . [TJhe future of our very lives and of our
democratic way of life rests in the hands of those who prepare the adults of
tomorrow."' Because of their important role in the fabric of our national com-
munity, the professional activities of teachers are viewed with keen interest.
Therefore, it is with an uneasy eye that the public has been viewing the
growing unrest and militancy in the teaching profession.5 This bellicose attitude
has been recently manifested by teacher strikes, strike threats, or mass resigna-
tions in such states as Florida,' Illinois,7 Michigan," New York,' Ohio ° and
Rhode Island." As one writer has described this new mood:
No Madison Avenue campaign has ever changed a clients image as
radically as the nation's teachers have changed theirs. Kindly Mr. Chips
1 N.Y. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT, § 210(1) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
2 N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1967, at 52, col. 6 (city ed.).
3 ABA, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAw, PROCEEDINGS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON LABOR RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES 93 (1955-56).
4 L. GARBER & H. SMITH, THE LAW AND THE TEACHER IN ILLINOIS 116 (1965).
5 In recent years, the staid teaching profession has erupted with demands for con-
siderations of its views. Still making obeisance to their professional status, teacher
organizations behave like trade unions as they discuss mutual problems with their
employing Board of Education.
Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens, 16 LAB. L.J. 685, 694 (1965).
6 N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1967, at 48, col. 1 (city ed.).
7 Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 16, 1967, at 1, col. 1 (final home ed.).
8 N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1967, at 48, col. 1 (city ed.).
9 Id., Sept. 11, 1967, at 1, c6l. 8 (city ed.).
10 Id., Sept. 7, 1967, at 29, col. 8 (city ed.).
11 Id., Sept. 7, 1967, at 29, col. 7 (city ed.).
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and modest schoolmarm have been wiped off the public mind. Tough
union leaders and equally tough spokesmen for the once soft-spoken National
Education Association and its local affiliates leave no doubt that their
mission is not to get a charitable apple for their teachers but to bring home
the bacon of new pay scales and power over school policy.' 2
It is in light of these new developments that this Note will re-evaluate the
legal status of concerted work stoppages by the teaching profession. This in-
vestigation will necessarily include an examination of the organizational efforts
of teachers and their success in communicating with school boards through the
vehicle of collective bargaining. More importantly, considering the increased
aggressiveness of teachers in asserting their demands, the Note will analyze the
teacher strike: the factors leading to its use, the legal consequences thereof and
the validity of the reasons offered for its illegality. Finally, it will enumerate the
traditional alternatives to the strike and propose suggestions for the future.
II. Organizational Efforts
"Public school teachers are exceptionally well organized."'" The giant in
the field is the National Education Association [hereinafter NEA] which, at
the end of the first quarter of 1967, held the allegiance of some one million
teachers.'" The NEA is challenged in its quest for teachers' loyalty by the
American Federation of Teachers [hereinafter AFT], a rapidly-growing sibling of
the AFL-CIO comprised of approximately 125,000 members." While the
NEA has great strength in all areas of the country, the AFT and its affiliates
have concentrated membership drives in the large metropolitan areas and have
won exclusive representation rights in New York City, Philadelphia, Detroit,
Cleveland, Chicago, and Boston. 6
The spreading militancy among teachers is caused in part by the struggle
between the NEA and the AFT for new members.' Although competition be-
tween the two rival organizations has always existed, it rose to a new pitch
with the 1961 election of the United Federation of Teachers [hereinafter UFT],
an affiliate of the AFT, as sole bargaining representative for the teachers in New
12 Hechinger, New Teacher Militancy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1967, at 19, col. 3 (city ed.).
13 Glass, Work Stoppages and Teachers: History and Prospect, MONTHLY LAB. REV., vol.
90, Aug., 1967, at 43.
14 Id. at 43-44.
15 Id. For a general discussion of both the NBA and the AFT, see M. MosKow,
TEACHERS AND UNIONS 93-114 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Mosxow].
16 ABA, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, REPORTS AND PROGRAM, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON LAw OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 149 (1966). For a description of
the events leading up to the election of the Detroit Federation of Teachers as the exclusive
bargaining representative in that city, see ABA, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, REPORTS
AND PROCEEDINGS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LAW OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELA-
TIONS 381-83 (1964). A similar account on the election of the UFT in New York City is
found in ABA, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, REPORTS AND PROCEEDINGS, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON LAW OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 143-49 (1963).
17 Brown, Teacher Power Techniques, AM. SCHOOL BD. J., vol. 152, Feb., 1966, at 12, points
out that:
The present teacher militancy, though rooted in economic conditions, is fed and
fertilized by competition between the NEA and the AFT. In the search for member-
ship and support, each is attempting to demonstrate to prospective members that it
can and does win greater benefits for teachers than the other.
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York City." By calling a one-day strike in April, 1962, in which 20,000 teachers
refused to work, the UFT was able to obtain a very favorable collective bargain-
ing agreement with the city. 9 The substantial gains made by the UFT and
other AFT affiliates through the use of more aggressive methods have placed
increasing pressure on the NEA to pursue similar tactics.2" Consequently,
Affiliates of the National Education Association, which had not been
involved in a single stoppage in the 12-year period, 1952-63, and none in
1965, participated in 11 in 1966 .... These 11 stoppages accounted for
more than 80 percent of all teachers involved in 1966 stoppages.
2
1
The organizational rivalry between the NEA and the AFT offers little hope
of subsiding. Emboldened by their recent successes in New York and Detroit,
AFT officials will surely intensify their efforts to recruit new members.22 This,
in turn, will place corresponding pressure on the NBA to step up their efforts
with the result that the organizational efforts of both groups are likely to in-
crease in the future.
III. Recognition and Collective Bargaining
A. Recognition"
In the past, salaries and working conditions for teachers were established
unilaterally by the local board of education.24 Thus, teachers were placed in a
position where they had no choice but to accept the decision of the board with
regard to these issues. Today, however, boards of education are being forced
18 Mosxsow 98-100; Radke, Real Significance of Collective Bargaining for Teachers, 15
LAB. L.J. 795, 800 (1964).
19 Mosxow 100. For a general examination of the terms of the 1962 agreement that the
UFT obtained from the city, see ABA, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, REPORTS AND
PROCEEDINGS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LAW OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
146-49 (1963).
20 MosKow 182, remarks: "It is often claimed that the AFT is more militant than the
NEA, yet when the local afilates were examined [in study made by the author], many cases
were found in which these traditional roles were completely reversed." Another author has
noted that "... the NEA is running a serious risk of becoming indistinguishable from the Fed-
eration." Collins, Labor Relations under Boards of Education and in Other Municipal Employ-
ment, N.Y.U. 19TH CONF. ON LAB. 189 (1967).
An opposite view was taken in Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers, Local 59 v. Obermeyer,
275 Minn. 347, 147 N.W.2d 358, 361 (1966), where the court observed:
These two organizations have deep and irreconcilable differences which give rise
to a conflict between them as to the manner in which teachers should communicate
and treat with school boards on subjects relating to wages and conditions of em-
ployment. (Footnote omitted.)
21 Glass, supra note 13, at 44.
22 An underlying reason for the success of the AFT is the financial and advisory aid ren-
dered by the AFL-CIO. In the latter's drive to organize "white collar" and professional
workers, successful unionization of the teaching profession would be "an important stepping
stone." Mosrow 99.
23 Since this area will not be treated in depth, a general discussion of exclusive recognition
in the public education field can be found in M. LIEBERMAN & M. Mosiow, COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS FOR TEACHERS 91-120 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LIEBERMAN & MOSxOW
and at MosKow 127-36. See also Seitz, Rights of School Teachers to Engage in Labor Organi-
zational Activities, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 36 (1960).
24 Mosicow 1. The terms "school board" and "board of education" are used synony-
mously to denote the local statutory political unit that is delegated control over education.
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to at least listen to and consider the requests of teacher organizations. "The days
when a delegation from the local teachers' organizations waited upon the
superintendent and school board and politely presented their request are over.
The days when the school board can arbitrarily deny those requests are also
over."
2 5
Yet the fact that school boards are finally giving attention to teacher de-
mands is of little significance unless there is some official form of exclusive
recognition. In localities where the board recognizes and deals with two or
more teacher organizations, the position of the teacher is weakened considerably.",
Needless to say, where one organization is the exclusive representative of all the
teachers in a district, the converse is true. However, current school board
practice regarding recognition differs greatly. Although some states provide for
exclusive recognition by statute, 7
as of 1966 most states have no statutory or judicial requirements,
authorizations, or prohibitions concerning recognition. As a result, most
school districts are legally free to take whatever action they wish concerning
recognition. This legal freedom is conditioned by local attitudes toward
recognition, and the result is a variety of practices encompassing all the
types of recognition in education.2s
The fact that exclusive recognition is an obvious benefit to teacher organiza-
tions, coupled with the wide divergence of policy of most states on the topic,
lends credence to the conclusion that ". . . recognition has been, is, and will
continue to be a major problem for many years to come.
2 9
B. Collective Bargaining
1. Arguments Pro and Con
One of the ways in which teacher organizations impart their demands to
school boards is through the medium of collective bargaining."0 Many attempts
to establish a general rapport between these two camps have ended in failure.
25 Boutwell, What's Happening in Education? THE PTA MAoAZiNm, vol. 61, Jan., 1967,
at 17.
26 Before the 1961 election in New York City, supra note 18 and accompanying text, the
Board of Education accorded equal representation rights to some ninety-three different teacher
organizations. LrEBERMAN & Mosnow 92.
27 See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 149, § 178H (Supp. 1966); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §
17.455(11) (Supp. 1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-3 (Supp. 1966).
28 LIERERMAN & MosKow 101-02. "Unless there is enabling statutory legislation (and
generally throughout the country there is not such legislation) there are no established pro-
cedures by which unions or organizations of teachers . . . can compel School Boards to recog-
nize them and bargain collectively." Seitz, Rights of School Teachers to Engage in Labor Orga-
nizational Activities, supra note 23, at 36.
However, the NEA Research Division reports: "In 1966-67, more than 41 percent of the
instructional staff of the United States were recognized by their school boards for purposes of
negotiation." NEA J., vol. 56, Sept., 1967, at 34.
29 LiEBERMANN & MOSKOW 100.
30 There has been a problem of semantics in this area. Because the NEA considers itself
more of a professional organization, it prefers the term "professional negotiations." The AFT,
on the other hand, uses the familiar union phrase "collective bargaining." For purposes of
consistency, this writer will use the term "collective bargaining" to designate situations in
which the representative teacher organization, be it the NBA or the AFT, meets with the local
school board to discuss salaries and working conditions. LiEBERMAN & Mosiow, at 1-6, dis-
cusses this issue and uses the designation "collective negotiations" as a compromise.
[February 1968]
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A review of the attempts of public school teachers to obtain some satisfactory
basis for meaningful communication with school boards by which their
demands might be made known, considered, and resolved in a manner con-
sistent with individual dignity .and the ethics of their calling is a study of
frustration.3 1
General power over education rests in the state governments. 2 Although
this power is set forth in the constitution of each state,3 " ... most provisions
are very general, and the legislature is usually given responsibility for the estab-
lishment, maintenance, or support of the schools. Generally, state constitutions
place few restrictions on the power of the legislature to control education."3"
Because education is a function of the state, local boards of education are re-
garded only as agents exercising the delegated power of the state. 5 Those who
would refuse to allow boards of education to bargain collectively argue that to
authorize such a practice would be to delegate the power of the sovereign to a
group of individuals.3 " Opponents of collective bargaining for teachers maintain
that if the school board is forced to concede to proposals in a bargaining session,
it would constitute an illegal delegation of the sovereign's power since the teachers,
not the board, would be establishing salaries and working conditions. For this
reason, the "delegation-of-authority" argument is frequently used to deny
teachers the right to bargain collectively with school boards.
This argument appears both unrealistic and untenable for several reasons.
First, "[t]here is no overwhelming evidence to indicate that the use of bargain-
ing power by public school teachers is detrimental to the public interest."
' 7
Quite the contrary, school boards could benefit from collective bargaining with
teacher groups.
One of the most valuable resources of the school board is the teaching
staff. They are experienced and knowledgeable in the day to day opera-
31 Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers, Local 59 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347, 147 N.W.2d
358, 361 (1966).
32 L. GARBER & H. SMITH, supra note 4, at 6, where the authors observe:
... it is generally agreed that education is a function of the state - that in the
state is to be found the authority to create, maintain, and support a system of public
schools. This follows from the fact that, in our form of government, the state is
sovereign. Its authority, expressed in its constitution and statutes, is unlimited except
with respect to those powers it... specifically granted to the federal government by
the United States Constitution. Education not being one of these powers, it is re-
tained by the states. With this, the courts of both the states and the federal govern-
ment are in total agreement.
33 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. 14, §§ 256-70; ILL. CONST. art. 8, §§ 1-5; OHIO CONST.
art. 6, §§ 1-4; WIs. CONST. art. 10, §§ 1-8.
34 Mosxow 19.
35 Rezny, School Board Procedure and Non-Delegable Power, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
SCHOOL BOARDS 17 (A. Rezny ed. 1966) points out: "The school board is an administrative
unit of government. It is an agent of the state and is given mandatory, directory, or permis-
sive powers to carry out the educational program established by the state."
36 Dean Seitz summarized this argument:
1. The fixing of conditions of work in the public service is a legislative function.
2. Neither the executive nor the legislative body may delegate such functions to an
outside group.
3. The legislature or executive must be free to change the conditions of employment
at any time. (Footnote omitted.) Seitz, Legal Aspects of Public School Teacher
Negotiating and Participating in Concerted Activities, 49 MARQ. L. Rav. 487, 488 (1966).





tions of the school system. As professional personnel, they are theoretically
concerned more with the public interest than their own private interests.
In addition, they have been professionally trained and probably have some
ideas on how the school system could be improved. Obviously, not all
of their ideas will be acceptable, but it nevertheless would be foolish not
to take advantage of their expertise. It is possible that collective bargain-
ing may be the mechanism which could be used by the school board to
receive the benefits of the teachers' experience. Thus, collective bargaining
may actually increase the effectiveness of the schools, and therefore benefit
the public interest. 8
Secondly, besides providing the school board with constructive ideas from
individuals versed in the everyday needs of the system, collective bargaining
would cultivate healthful relations between the board and the teaching staff."
Not only would good faith collective bargaining be sound personnel administra-
tion with regard to the teachers, it would also create "... . a climate which will
enlighten the general public as to problems of the school and enlist assistance
for their solution."4
Finally, it can be argued that school boards do not delegate any sovereign
power when bargaining with teacher representatives. Collective bargaining does
not require the board of education to capitulate to teacher demands.4 It merely
means that the local board is using a different medium, collective bargaining,
in the exercise of its delegated powers.4" The final decision in all cases will rest
with the school board itself and the fact that it has given consideration to pro-
posals from outside sources should not render such decisions invalid delegations
of sovereign power. "It is submitted that boards of education might very well
stop trying to label provisions for collective bargaining illegal and turn their at-
tention toward working out procedures which will make . . . bargaining some-
thing which is practical and expeditious."'"
2. Statutory Enactments
Many state statutes on this topic are permissive in nature. That is, they
allow the governmental unit to bargain collectively, but they do not require it
to do so. 44 However, there is a definite trend today to compel school boards to
meet with teacher representatives and negotiate such items as wages and working
38 Id. at 181-82.
39 Seitz, Rights of School Teachers to Engage in Labor Organizational Activities, supra note
23, at 43. This rationale is evident in the policy statements of the several states which have
mandatory collective bargaining on the part of school boards. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 28-9.3-1 (Supp. 1966), where the legislature proclaimed that it ". . . recognizes teaching
as a profession which requires special educational qualifications and that to achieve high qual-
ity education it is indispensable that good relations exist between teaching personnel and school
committees." (Emphasis added.)
40 Seitz, Rights of School Teachers to Engage in Labor Organizational Activities, supra
note 23, at 43.
41 Id.
42 Note, Union Activity in Public Employment, 55 COLUM. L. Rxv. 343, 351 (1955).
43 Seitz, Legal Aspects of Public School Teacher Negotiating and Participating in Con-
certed Activities, supra note 36, at 509.
44 E.g., ALAsKA STAT., § 23.40.010 (1962) provides:
(a) The state or a political subdivision of the state, including but not limited to
an organized borough, municipal corporation, independent school district, incor-
porated school district, and public utility district, may enter into a contract with a
[February, 1968]
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conditions. Within recent years, at least nine states have enacted provisions that
make collective bargaining on the part of the school board mandatory rather
than merely permissive."5
Typical of such legislation is the Rhode Island School Teachers' Arbitration
Act,;6 approved in 1966. It grants teachers the right to organize-and bargain
collectively,"r provides for exclusive recognition," and requires the school board
to bargain in good faith. 9 Election of a bargaining agent is supervised by the
state labor relations board upon submission of a written petition signed by at
least twenty percent of the teachers in the particular district.50 When negotiations
involve salaries or other matters requiring an appropriation of money, the teacher
representative must notify the board at least four months prior to the final date
on which the money can be appropriated."' Issues that are unresolved by such
negotiations are submitted to mediation and, when an impasse still occurs, to
binding arbitration.52 Although the Rhode Island act is a laudable piece of
legislation, it illustrates one of the basic weaknesses of collective bargaining for
teachers by providing that the decision of the arbitrators is binding on all matters
except those "involving the expenditure of money."5 3 Such weaknesses could
prove to be fatal to the operation of such compulsory arbitration programs.
3. Difficulties Inherent in Collective Bargaining for Teachers
The very fact that education is a state function raises doubts as to the real
viability of collective bargaining between school boards and teachers. One of
the essential factors for successful collective negotiations in the private sector is
that management has the ability to make binding commitments with labor. This
is not always possible in the public area. 4 While the basic source of revenue
for the local school district is the property tax, a substantial percentage is derived
labor organization whose members furnish services to the state or the political sub-
division.
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter requires the state or political subdivision
of the state to enter into a union contract.
45 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13085 (West Supp. 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153d
(1967); MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp. 1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(15)
(Supp. 1965); N.Y. PUBLic EMPLOYEES' FAmr EMPLOYMENT ACT § 204(2) (McKinney Supp.
1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 342.460(1) (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-4 (Supp.
1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28.72.030 (Supp. 1966); Ws. STAT. ANN. § 111.84(1) (d)
(Supp. 1967). The New York statute declares: "Where an employee organization has been
certified or recognized. . . , the appropriate public employer shall be... required to negotiate
collectively with such employee organization ... ." (Emphasis added.)
46 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.3-1 to 28-9.3-16 (Supp. 1966).
47 Id. § 28-9.3-2.
48 Id. § 28-9.3-3.
49 Id. § 28-9.3-4.
50 Id. §§ 28-9.3-5, 28-9.3-6.
51 Id. § 28-9.3-8.
52 Id. §§ 28-9.3-9 to 28-9.3-12.
53 Id. § 28-9.3-12.
54 Wollett, The Public Employee at the Bargaining Table: Promise or Illusion? 15 LAB.
L.J. 8, 9 (1964). This limitation was recognized in one of the most widely quoted cases on
the issue of teachers' right. In Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269,
277, 83 A.2d 482, 486 (1951), the Supreme Court of Connecticut stated that the -right of
teachers to organize and bargain collectively "... . means nothing more than that the plaintiff
may organize and bargain collectively for the pay and working conditions which it may be in
the power of the board of education to grant." (Emphasis added.)
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from the state.55 Therefore, since the local school district is dependent upon
state allocations to supplement its own resources, it is difficult, if not impossible,
for the school board to bargain meaningfully with teacher organizations over
matters that require an increase in spending.56 Other subjects that may be
beyond the pale of teacher-school board negotiations because they are controlled
by state law include certification,5" retirement" and tenure.5 Consequently, de-
pending upon the amount of control exercised by the particular state, the scope
of the bargaining power possessed by the board of education may be narrowed
considerably."0
Collective bargaining between teachers and school boards today, therefore,
occupies a vast "middle ground." School boards can bargain, but not on all
subjects; they can make comnmitments, but they may not be binding. It seems
likely that collective bargaining under this "middle ground" approach will
evolve into one of two possible forms: a hollow process through which only
minor, nonessential issues are resolved or a highly complex arrangement including
state as well as local officials.
4. Suggestions for the Future
Two possible alternatives might be available to avoid the complications
that arise under the "middle ground" approach. Both possibilities involve the
degree of control exercised by the board. One solution might be to delegate
more authority to the local board of education.61 By increasing the possible
sources of revenue available to the board and its control over such sources, the
problem of bargaining over matters that call for an increase in spending would
be lessened. 2 However, inability to bargain over topics regulated by state law
would remain.
55 In 1961-62, 56.9 percent of public school revenues came from local tax sources, 38.7
percent was received as grants . . . from state governments, and 4.3 percent was
received in grants from the federal government.
Approximately 53 percent of all expenditures for public education are financed
by the general property tax ....
Mosxcow 13.
56 Wollett, supra note 54, at 10, writes "... if an increase in teachers' salaries depends
upon expansion of the revenues available for the school district, the procedures of collective
bargaining are useless."
Hence, the reason for the Rhode Island provision, R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9.3-8
(Supp. 1966), noted earlier in note 51. By requiring teacher bargaining agents to tender a one
hundred and twenty day advance notification whenever negotiations will involve an expenditure
of money, the statute gives the parties a chance to reach agreement before the deadline on
submission of budget appropriations to the state.
57 See, e.g., ARiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-231 to 15-234 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
168.011-168.091 (1965); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 342.120-342.190 (1965).
58 See, e.g., ARIZ. RBEV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-1401 to 15-1471 (1956); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 13801-14415 (West 1960); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-2901 to 32-2929 (1952).
59 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-251 to 15-261 (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18:13-16 to 18:13-20 (Gum. Supp. 1964); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 342.805-342.955 (1965).
60 See Mosrow 19, where the author writes:
Because of the considerable degree of state control of public education, certain
subjects . .. will be precluded from local level collective bargaining in most cases ....
[G]reat variety exists among the states in the degree of state control of working
conditions of teachers. Thus, the appropriateness of local level collective bargaining
on any given topic will depend on the conditions in that particular state.
61 One commentator refers to the establishment of fiscally independent school boards,
advocated by both the NEA and the AFT, as "suicidal." Lieberman, Teachers' Strikes:
Acceptable Strategy? 46 PHi DELTA KAPPAN 237, 240 (1965).
62 See generally Mosseow 31, where the author admits that any attempt to increase
[February, 1968]
A second solution might be to shift financing of public education from the
local to the state level. Instead of relying on the property tax to supply revenue
for education, the state could appropriate a graduated percentage of each in-
dividual's income.63 Such an assessment could be levied in conjunction with
the state income tax prevailing in many states or through an independent
system. Allocation of funds could be made to each school district on the basis
of a budget submitted by the local board of education. This would raise the
quality of education throughout the state by making more funds available to
poorer school districts.
The advantage of such an arrangement is that it would enable teacher
organizations and school boards to bargain more effectively. Demands for an
increase in revenue could be made at the state level through the process of
budgetary hearings. This is also true with regard to the various state-controlled
matters, such as retirement and tenure. At the local level, school boards would
be able to make more definite proposals on salary increases. Whatever may be
the final development in this area, the answers to the present problems "... . lie,
not in the past, but in the future - in ideas as yet undiscovered and in experi-
ments not yet undertaken, demanding fresh perspectives and new approaches."'"
IV. Teacher Strikes
A. Causes of Teacher Militancy
As pointed out earlier, there is a growing feeling of militancy on the part
of teachers throughout the nation. Along with the recent upsurge of strikes
by public employees in general,6" those on the part of teachers have also in-
creased.6 6 During the period 1956-1966, there were only thirty-five recorded
teacher strikes.6" However, "[t]he year of 1966 marked a sudden upswing...
Thirty-three stoppages were recorded during the year, followed by an additional
11 in the first quarter of 1967."68
One of the reasons for this new spirit of aggressiveness, the rivalry between
the NEA and the AFT, has already been discussed.6 9 Although teacher militancy
may be "... fed and fertilized by competition between the NEA and the AFT,""0
the primary reason for the current unrest is money. Teachers simply want higher
salaries for the work they are performing.
revenues for education presents a "unique problem" and goes on to state:
In order to achieve maximum success, any attempt would have to be a two-pronged
effort. First, efforts would have to be directed at increasing the aspirations and
goals of the school board, and second, efforts would have to be directed at changing
the attitudes of the citizens in the community.
63 Under the property tax method of raising educational revenue, all property owners
are taxed-regardless of whether or not they have children using the schools. The rationale
is that all taxpayers must pay for a public service even though they may not take advantage
of it. The same rationale is carried through under this plan.
64 Wollett, supra note 54, at 15.
65 Glass, Work Stoppages and Teachers: History and Prospect, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,




69 See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
70 Brown, Teacher Power Techniques, Am. SCHOOL BD. J., vol. 152, Feb., 1966, at 12.
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Dissatisfaction with salaries is still the most concrete grievance. Pay
for urban teachers has more than tripled since 1939, but these gains lag
behind those of industrial workers. And they cannot stand comparison
with the top brackets of other professions, such as law, medicine and en-
gineering.
Average teachers' salaries now amount to $7,000, but only slightly
more than 6 percent of the nation's two million teachers are in the
$10,000 and above category, and the "above" rarely exceeds $13,000.71
Although minimum teachers' salaries are usually established by the legislature,72
the exact amount is left up to the local school board with the result that salaries
may vary considerably throughout the state.7" School boards and administrators
themselves often recognize the legitimacy of teacher demands for higher salaries,
but confess that they do not have the financial resources to satisfy such requests. 4
Closely related to the problem of salary increases is the wage structure itself,
which is based on seniority. Teachers consider their vocation a "profession."
Yet it is subject to so many regulations that it approaches the status of a civil
service job. One writer perceptively views the problem as "... . how to satisfy
professional salary demands within a civil service wage structure with automatic
step-up for great numbers and with little or no differentiation between mediocre
and successful accomplishments."75
A more general reason for the upswing in teacher strikes is the increased
use of militancy by minority groups throughout the nation. This is most notable
in the civil rights and anti-Vietnam protestations. These massed displays of
power have not gone unnoticed by teachers who ". .. see other power blocs
getting their share not through reasonableness but by belligerence. Even in their
own field, they have seen administrators' cliques neutralize Board of Education
policies. They see parents' and community groups conquering new fields of
power."'76 Finally, an added element in large metropolitan areas is the problem
71 Hechinger, New Teacher Militancy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1967, at 19, col. 3 '(city ed.).
72 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1327(a)(1) (Supp. 1967) ($3,600); CAL. EDuc.
CoDn § 13525 (West Supp. 1966) ($5,000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-7-2 (1966) ($4,000).
The quoted figures are the minimum starting salary for a teacher with a bachelor's degree.
73 N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1967, at 48, col. 2 (city ed.), reporting on the recent teacher
work stoppages in Florida, noted: "Teacher salaries, which are paid in Florida by a combina-
tion of state and county taxes, vary widely throughout the state, according to the amount
of local support."
.74 During the recent strike in Detroit, the superintendent of schools for that city stated:
"Our teachers would be justified in receiving more than we offer them .... But we simply
.do not have the funds." N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1967, at 19, col. 5 (city ed.).
Similarly, on the eve of the strike in New York City, the President of the Board of
Education declared:
For many months the Superintendent of Schools . . . has negotiated with the
teachers' representatives. We were restricted by lack of funds. One cannot bargain
with an empty pocketbook. We publicly declared to the Mayor and the public that
we were unable to make an adequate offer to meet the legitimate req'uirements of our
teachers and appealed urgently for funds. We knew our teachers were entitled to
more than our budget could permit. (Emphasis added.)
N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1967, at 18, col. 3 (city ed.).
75 Hechinger, supra note 71.
* 76 Id. at col. 4.
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of the ghetto school with its overtones of racial strife, poor working conditions,
and educationally deprived children."
B. Teacher Pressure Tactics
Of the various pressures that are available to public school teachers, the
most controversial, by far, is the strike." In spite of the recent furor over strikes
by teachers, there are still many within the profession who do not favor such
conduct. A recent probability sample of both members and nonmembers taken
by the Research Division of the NEA disclosed:
More than one-third of all public school teachers believe categorically that
teachers should never strike. On the other hand, one-half of all teachers
believe teachers should strike, but only under extreme conditions and after
all other means have failed.
7 9
Likewise, "... public employee organization officials agree that the strike is
a last resort .... ",so Analyzed with respect to this criterion, the increase in
teacher strikes indicates that more and more teachers feel placed in a "last
resort" position.
When employed, "... a teacher strike in which the teachers are united,
well organized, adequately financed, and ably led can exert tremendous bar-
gaining power on a school board or other governmental body."'" However, these
conditions are not easily achieved.
In order for the teachers to be united, their cause must be clear and con-
vincing to the overwhelming majority of them. Even if it. is clear and
convincing, the teachers must be ready to assume the risks inherent in a
strike. Unless extensive preparations are made, teachers will ordinarily
not be willing to assume the risks, however justified they believe their
objectives to be.
2
On account of these difficulties, the threat of a strike may often be more effective
than the strike itself. 8
Apart from their legality, which will be discussed later, teacher strikes have
been criticized as having the effect of alienating the public.84 While teacher
77 Indeed, one of the major issues in the New York strike was the UFT's demand for
additional expenditures to increase the More Effective Schools program designed to aid
culturally deprived slum children. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1967, at 79, col. 1-2.
78 Strikes by public employees have been the subject of several recent commentaries.
See, e.g., Foegen, A Qualified Right to Strike-in the Public Interest, 18 LAB. L.J. 90 (1967);
Sullivan, How Can the Problem of the Public Employees Strike be Resolved? 19 OKLA. L.
Rav. 365 (1966); Comment, Right of Public Employees to Strike, 16 DEPAUL L. Pv. 151
(1966); Note, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 Wis. L. Rlv.
549.
79 NEA J., vol. 55, May, 1966, at 54.
80 BusinEss WnEx, Dec. 3, 1966, at 96.
81 LEBERMAN & Mosxow 302.
82 Id.
83 Wollett, supra note 54, at 12.
84 Id. at 13; Brown, supra note 70, at 12-13.
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organizations feel that strikes serve a useful purpose by eliciting public support
for their cause,"5 one commentator has stated that:
* . . it remains doubtful that either strikes or strike threats, even with all
their accompanying sound and fury, are genuinely effective. Occasionally
they may be, but in the main it seems more probable than not that they
will be self-defeating, serving primarily to alienate the public whose support
is needed in order to finance improvements .... 8
Even though this objection may have merit, strikes still occur and often terminate
with very favorable contracts for the striking teachers. 7
A second coercive technique utilized by teacher organizations is that of
"mass resignations." Using this method, teachers fill out uniform resignation
forms supplied by the local teacher organization. 8 These are then held by the
individual teacher or returned to the organization. The purpose is the same
under both approaches - to threaten the school board with the loss of a sizable
portion of its instructional staff unless teacher demands are met. Recent examples
of this approach include Florida 9 and New York City where the superintendent
of schools admitted that ". . . the board would not be able to replace the in-
structors in the event of a mass resignation."9 The difficulty inherent in the use
of this technique is that unless the resignations are truly "individual," in the
sense that each teacher submits his own resignation to the board of education,
teachers run the risk of being enjoined by the courts for participating in a con-
certed work stoppage or strike."
85 During the New York City teachers' strike, the president of the UFT was quoted as
saying that the union's purpose in defying the anti-strike law was to "mobilize public opinion
and public support." N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1967, at 52, col. 6 (city ed.).
86 Wollett, supra note 54, at 13.
87 The strike in Detroit ended with the largest contract in the history of the local
affiliate of the AFT. The school year was reduced; teacher participation in textbook
selection and curriculum arrangement increased; and starting salaries for the holder of a B. A.
degree raised from $5,800 to $6,650 the first year the contract is in effect, and to $7,500
the second year. Little wonder that the vice-president of the union remarked that there
" 'was nothing else to be wrung' from the school board." N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1967, at
36, col. 7 (city ed.).
88 The teachers in Pawtuckett, Rhode Island, staged a walkout similar to a mass
resignation in 1965. Although individual teachers did not submit resignation forms, they
did refuse to work after members of their negotiating committee and the president of the
state federation each read the following statement before a mass meeting of the city's
teachers:
On the basis of the highest law of the land, the Constitution of the United
States, and specifically the Thirteenth Amendment which prohibits forced and
involuntary servitude, and on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court of
the State of Rhode Island which cites Manchester v. Manchester Teachers' Guild,
1-100 New Hampshire, 507, 512, (131 A.2d 59) "the preliminary injunction
restrained the concerted action of the respondents but did not in any way impose
on any individual the obligation to work against his will."
On this legal basis and owing to the conditions existing in the Pawtuckett
School System. I .... [name of individual], as an individual, will not work in the
Pawtuckett School System until true collective bargaining prevails between my
Teachers Alliance and the School Committee of the City of Pawtuckett.
School Comm. v. Pawtuckett Teachers Alliance, Local 930, 221 A.2d 806, 810 n.1 (R.I.
1966).
89 N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1967, at 48, col. 1 (city ed.).
90 N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1967, at 26, col. 8.
91 Opinion of the court in Board of Educ. v. Shanker, dated Sept. 13, 1967, granting a




A third pressure tactic available to teachers is the use of "sanctions."
Sanctions are the creation of the NEA and, as employed by that organization,
r• . .mean censure, suspension or expulsion of a member; severance of
relationship with an affiliated association or other agency; imposing of a
deterrent against a board of education or other agency controlling the wel-
fare of the schools; bringing into play forces that will enable the community
to help the board or agency to realize its responsibility; or the application
of one or more steps in the withholding of services. 2
There are different forms of sanctions,9" but in their " ... most severe form...
sanctions mean that NBA members in the jurisdiction refrain from negotiating
new contracts and NEA members elsewhere are advised of the situation."
94
Despite the contention made by some that sanctions are synonymous with
strikes," "[t]he truth is there is a vast difference. Sanctions do not propose to
violate a contract, do not interrupt services to children, do not use the picket line
to assure the dosing of schools."9 "
When used adroitly by a teacher organization, sanctions could prove to be
a far more devastating weapon than the strike. Unlike the strike which is always
illegal,97 properly invoked sanctions could probably not be enjoined by the courts.
Dean Seitz has commented:
It is hard to find any illegality in the sanction which is sparked only
by an appeal to teachers not to sign contracts or take jobs in an area.
This sort of an appeal is surely free speech and the individual certainly
has a constitutional right to determine if he will work. Illegality would
appear only if the organization induced some kind of boycott pressure which
resulted in teachers who did not heed the call to sanction losing job op-
portunities."'
The deleterious effect of full and successful sanctions upon a school system or
state would be far greater than that of a strike. An iron-clad state-wide sanction
could virtually bring the entire educational system to its knees and impair its
efficiency far into the future.
If a school board or state meets the demands of the teachers shortly
after sanctions are imposed, the harm they do will be negligible. If the
sanctions continue for an extended period of time, and the organization
is successful in cutting off the supply of new teachers and persuading those
in the system to relocate, the school administration will probably not be
92 NEA, Guidelines for Professional Sanctions 9 (1963), cited in Mosicow 199.
93 Mosxow 199-200, again quoting from the NEA's Guidelines for Professional Sanctions,
cites various types of sanctions in addition to that of refusal to enter into a new contract.
94 Klein, The NEA Convention and the Organizing of Teachers, 87 MONTHLY LAB. RIv.
882, 884 (1964).
95 Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens, 16 LAB. L.J. 685, 694
(1965), where the author declares: "The word 'sanctions' is merely educationalese for the
word 'strike.' "
96 Stinnett, Professional Negotiation, Collective Bargaining, Sanctions, and Strikes,
BULLETIN OF THE NATIONAL AssocrATIoN OF SECONDARY-SCHOOL PRINCIPALS, vol. 48, April,
1964, at 101.
97 See text accompanying notes 104-10 infra.
98 Seitz, Legal Aspects of Public School Teacher Negotiating and Participating in Con-
certed Activities, 49 MAR2. L. REv. 487, 506 (1966).
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able to hire a fully qualified staff even if and(when it meets the demands
of the teachers. Unless the original teaching staff was of poorer quality
than the new staff . . . , considerable harm may be done by this form of
sanctions. Even with good working conditions, it usually takes years to
build up a high-quality teaching staff. If any substantial number of teachers
are persuaded to leave or to avoid employment in the system, it will be
virtually impossible for the system to be as effective as it was before the
imposition of the sanctions. 99
It is submitted that those who are concerned with the expanding use of the
strike by teacher organizations would be well advised to examine the far greater
possibility of harm engendered by legitimately imposed sanctions.
Finally, there are a host of less important methods which teachers can
employ to call attention to their demands and stimulate the school board into
action. They can refuse to participate in extracurricular activities,"°' picket the
school in their off-hours,' protest openly at public school board meetings02
and actively campaign in board of education elections.' Naturally, the applica-
tion of any given method will depend upon the goal to be attained and the
amount of pressure necessary to achieve it. The techniques set forth here serve
merely as illustrations and are limited only by the imagination of the individuals
who manipulate them.
C. Legal Status of Teachers' Strikes
There is no difference of opinion over the legal right of teachers to strike.
They are classified as governmental employees and ". . . every judicial decision
on the subject holds that there is no right to strike against the government."'0 4
This principle was recently reaffirmed in Board of Education v. Shanker, where
the court issued a permanent injunction against the striking UFT in New York
City and forcefully declared:
From time immemorial, it has been a fundamental principle that a
government employee may not strike. In this sensitive area, neither labor
- the public employee - nor management - the governmental agency -
in their mutual interdependence can afford the indulgence of arbitrary self-
interest at the expense of the public.'"
99 LIEBERMAN & MosKow 308. Sanctions were imposed upon Florida during the
summer of 1967 by the NEA and 2,385 teachers resigned in one county alone. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 7, 1967, at 25, col. 2 (city ed.).
100 MosKow 205.
101 Id. at 205-06.
102 Id. at 206.
103 Id.
104 Potts v. Hay, 229 Ark. 830, 318 S.W.2d 826, 827 (1958) (dictum). For an excellent
compilation of decisions denying governmental employees the right to strike, see Annot., 31
A.L.R.2d 1142 (1953).
105 Board of Educ. v. Shanker (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Oct. 4, 1967). Strikes by
teachers have also been struck down in Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn.
269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951) (declaratory judgment); South Bend Community School Corp. v.
South Bend Fed'n of Teachers, No. D-3208 (Super. Ct., St. Joseph County, Ind., filed Oct. 2,
1967); City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59
(1957); School Comm. v. Pawtuckett Teachers Alliance, Local 930, 221 A.2d 806 (R.I.




Apart from judicial decision, strikes by government employees are prohibited
by statute on the federal level"' and by the legislatures of at least sixteen states.'
Various reasons are offered in denying governmental employees the right
to strike. Some courts have declared that "... the underlying basis is the doctrine
that governmental functions may not be obstructed or impeded."'0 s Others have
stated that a strike by public employees violates the authority of the govern-
ment." 9 Lastly, prohibition of such strikes has been premised on the proposition
that public health and safety must be protected."0 An extra-legal element men-
tioned by courts that have enjoined teacher strikes is that such activity creates
an unfavorable impression on the children involved."' In South Bend Com-
munity School Corporation v. South Bend Federation of Teachers, the court
remarked:
It is difficult to conceive how teachers can demand and command respect
for the authority of their class room rules and at the same time appear
before their students outside the building in open defiance of their duties
under both public law and private contract.
1 2
While this last argument may possess merit; there is no empirical data to support
it. One commentator has remarked that "... . even in jurisdictions where a
strike is illegal, there is no convincing evidence that teacher strikes have had
any lasting impact on students because of the illegality factor.""'
D. Ineffectiveness of Anti-Strike Laws
Anti-strike legislation and judicial precedents have presented no real obstacle
106 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (Supp. II, 1964).
107 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153e (1967) (school teachers specifically); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 839.221 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1301 (1963); HAWAII REV. LAWS, § 5-8
(1955); MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 149, § 178M (Supp. 1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(2)
(1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.51 (1966); NEn. REV. STAT. § 48-821 (1960); N.Y.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT, § 210(1) (McKinney Supp. 1967); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02 (Page 1965); ORE. RV. STAT. § 243.760 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 43, § 215.2 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-1 (Supp. 1966) (school teachers
specifically); TEx. REv. Csv. STAT., art. 5154c(3) (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-65 (1953);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4) (1) (Supp. 1967).
108 City of Pawtuckett v. Pawtuckett Teachers Alliance, Local 930, 87 R.I. 364, 141
A.2d 624, 628 (1958). Accord, Board of Educ. of Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Red-
ding, 32 Ill.2d 567, 571-72, 207 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1965); City of Manchester v. Manchester
Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 510, 131 A.2d 59, 61 (1957).
109 Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 276, 83 A.2d. 482, 485
(1951); Board of Educ. v. Shanker (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Oct. 4, 1967).
110 Donevero v. Jersey City Incinerator Auth'y, 75 N.J. Super. 217, 222, 182 A.2d.
596, 599 (1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. McAleer v. Jersey City Incinerator Autl'y,
79 N.J. Super. 142, 190 A.2d. 891 (1963); Port of Seattle v. International Longshore. &
W.U., 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d. 1099, 1102 (1958).
111 South Bend Community School Corp. v. South Bend Fed'n of Teachers, No. D-3208
(Super. Ct., St. Joseph County, Ind., filed Oct. 2, 1967); Board of Educ. v. Shanker (Sup.
Ct.. N.Y. County, Oct. 4, 1967). Seitz, Legal Aspects of Public School Teacher Negotiating
and Participating in Concerted Activities, supra note 98, at 504, where the author writes
that "teachers cannot forget that they work in a delicate area where it is of the utmost
importance that young people be encouraged to respect the legimate authority of school
personnel."
112 No. D-3208 (Super. Ct., St. Joseph County, Ind., filed Oct. 2, 1967).




to teachers and have generally proven ineffective. Concrete examples of this
fact have already been mentioned. Despite the presence of specific legislation
prohibiting strikes by public employees in both Michigan and New York, teachers
refused to work in Detroit and New York City and received substantial contract
increases in each instance. There are several reasons why the legal remedies in
this area have proven inadequate.
First, anti-strike legislation that imposes severe penalties on the defiant em-
ployee may actually encourage strikes rather than prevent them. By denying
government workers the right to strike, this type of legislation may ". . . so
weaken the power of the employees that public employers perpetuate extremely
inequitable conditions of employment, to the point where the employees strike
anyway in desperation."'1 4
Second, the particular governmental unit involved may be reluctant to
invoke anti-strike legislation for fear that negotiations will be hampered."'
This was especially true under the recently-repealed Condon-Wadlin Act" 6 in
New York. The harsh discharge penalties of Condon-Wadlin ". . . became
unworkable because of the public employer's unwillingness to enforce them
against strong unions. In 1965 and 1966 this practice reached scandalous
proportions. .... ,,17
Third, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to completely re-staff a school
system if all of the teachers were discharged for participating in a strike. "From
a purely practical viewpoint, teachers en masse cannot be discharged even though
their conduct is treated as illegal.""' As one writer has summarized the problem:
Although a strike resulting from teacher discontent could be enjoined,
an injunction could be violated and the Board might be understandably
reluctant to jail violators because of political interests, fear of creating an
interminable deadlock, and the problems - more serious with teachers ...
- of replacing jailed workers." 9 (Footnotes omitted.)
The fourth and final reason why anti-strike legislation is largely impotent
to halt teacher walkouts is that no law can force people to work when they do
not want toY °20 Granted that strikes by teachers are illegal, if they feel that
circumstances warrant such drastic action, teachers will simply leave their posts
upon the expiration of their contracts, and there is absolutely no way in which
114 Id. at 239.
115 Although strikes are specifically banned by statute in Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. §
17.455(2) (1960), the Board of Education in Detroit did not take legal action against the
teachers. The N.Y. Times reported: "The Detroit system had not sought a court injunction
to end the strike. School board officials said the dispute would be settled more easily over the
bargaining table." N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1967, at 36, col. 8 (city ed.).
116 Law of April 15, 1958, ch. 790, § 108, [1958] McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y.
1007-08 (repealed 1967'). A limited discussion of the difficulties under Condon-Wadlin can
be found in Seitz, Public Employee Negotiating and School Board Authority, LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF SCHOOL BOARDS 144-46 (A. Rezny ed. 1966).
117 Gould, The New York Taylor Law: A Preliminary Assessment, 18 LAn. L.J. 323, 324
(1967).
118 Seitz, Public Employee Negotiating and School Board Authority, supra note 116, at
144.
119 Comment, Public Employee Collective Bargaining Contracts: The Chicago Teachers,
33 U. CH. L. REv. 852, 860 (1966).
120 See Millones, Taylor Law's Baptism, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1967, at 33, col. 1 (city ed.).
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the school board can force them to work. To merely label strike action illegal
and state that it can be enjoined by the courts does not solve the problem.
The mere conclusion that... striking on the part of school personnel
is not sanctioned, does not fully explain the right of the School Board in
combating such tactics. The injunction can be used to halt the activity.
School personnel can be discharged and disciplined. Contract rights may
be pursued. There is, however, no way by which individuals can be forced
to return to work?21 (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, "[iut must be acknowledged . . . that regardless of public opinion
toward strikes, and no matter what legal barriers may be raised by legislatures
or courts, public employee strikes will never be entirely eliminated."' 22
E. The New York Teachers' Strike
A brief examination of the strike by the UFT in New York City will serve
to illustrate the problems previously discussed. Although the strike began on
September 11, 1967, the day on which the city's schools were scheduled to open
for the new school year, the teachers' contracts with the city had expired on
June 30, 1967.123 Therefore, negotiations had been in progress for some time
prior to the stoppage. Against the background of the strike loomed the new
Taylor Law2 4 which became effective September 1, 1967, after being hailed
by Governor Rockefeller as "milestone legislation."' 25 Like its predecessor, the
Condon-Wadlin Act, the Taylor Law specifically forbade strikes on the part of
governmental employees. 26 Because of this, the UFT attempted to circumvent
the law's application through the device of "mass resignations."' 2 7 Resignation
forms completed by the teachers were not submitted individually to the Board
of Education, but were deposited with the union.1' 8 Despite the fact that their
contracts had expired, the court granted the Board's request for a preliminary
injunction declaring:
Of course, everyone has the right to resign his position and not return to
work, and this includes the teachers. No court, certainly in this country,
can compel a teacher to work if he or she did not wish to work. I find,
however, that in this case the teachers did not execute these resignations
for the purpose of not returning to work and leaving the employ of the
121 Seitz, Rights of School Teachers to Engage in Labor Organizational Activities, 44
MAIRQ. L. REv. 36, 43 (1960).
122 Note, Economic Institutions and Value Survey: Political Activity, Unionization and
Conflicts of Interest-Problem Areas of Public Employment, 40 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 606, 652
(1965).
123 Opinion of the court in Board of Educ. v. Shanker, dated Sept. 13, 1967, granting a
preliminary injunction and denying defendant's cross-motion, as found in N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15,
1967.
124 N.Y. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT, § 1-4 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
A detailed analysis of the new law appears in Gould, supra note 117.
125 Millones, supra note 120.
126 N.Y. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT, § 210(1) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
127 N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1967, at 18, col. 3-5 (city ed.).
128 Opinion of the court in Board of Educ. v. Shanker, dated Sept. 13, 1967, granting a




Board of Education. They executed these resignations at the union's
urging to compel their employer to accede to their demands and as a
concerted stoppage of work. It was done in an attempt to evade the pro-
visions of the Civil Service Law, the common law and the decisional law,
all of which, from time immemorial, forbids and makes illegal a strike on
the part of public employees. 2 9
Similarly, the court again rejected the union's attempt to differentiate between
"mass resignations" and a "strike" when, in issuing a permanent injunction, it
flatly stated: "Defendants, in contending that a strike is not the same as the
so-called resignations, are urging a distinction without a difference; the argument
is specious and a sham and is rejected." 30
The preliminary injunction failed to halt the strike.' 3 ' Even the judge who
issued the preliminary injunction seemed uncertain as to its real effectiveness
when he remarked: "The law would not terminate the strike .... The people
will have to terminate the strike - the Board of Education and the teachers."'3 2
Furthermore, while the city petitioned the court to enforce the penalty clauses
of the Taylor Law, it said "... . that it did not want the union leaders sent to
jail because this would hamper efforts to negotiate an end to the dispute."'M
3
The strike ended with a very favorable settlement package for the teachers. 34
Thus, although the UFT was fined and its president sentenced to jail for
contempt of court,'35 for all practical purposes the union was able to defy the
law and successfully force its demands upon the Board of Education. Perhaps
the most important underlying implication of the strike is its effect on the viability
of the Taylor Law. The success of the UFT will not go unnoticed by the other
municipal employee unions in New York. As the New York Times worriedly
surveyed the scene: "If the law - widely regarded as the best in any state -
is swept away in its first collision with a strong union, the strike fever is likely
to communicate itself swiftly to government workers at all levels all over the
country."' 36 While this dire prediction has yet to materialize, the inability of the
Taylor Law to halt the UFT strike serves only to reiterate the point discussed
previously: no law can compel teachers to work if they refuse to do so.
V. Objections to Strikes by Teachers - Are they Valid?
The law in the field of labor relations for public school teachers should
serve as a balancing mechanism to weigh competing public and private interests.
That is, the benefit that society derives from uninterrupted public services must
be balanced against the loss for teachers. Laws do not exist for the protection
129 Id.
130 Board of Educ. v. Shanker (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Oct. 4, 1967).
131 N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1967, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.).
132 Id., Sept. 17, 1967, § 4, at 1, col. 3.
133 Id., Sept. 18, 1967, at 1, col. 8, and at 50, col. 1 (city ed.).
134 Id., Sept. 28, 1967, at 50, col. 1 (city ed.). Increased minimum and maximum
salary rates for teachers holding a bachelor's degree were set at: (a) Old rate: $5,400 to
$9,950; (b) Sept. 1, 1967: $6,200 to $10,350; Sept. 1, 1968: $6,600 to $11,000; Sept. 1,
1969: $6,750 to $11,150.
135 Board of Educ. v. Shanker (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Oct. 4, 1967). The union was
fined $150,000. Mr. Shanker was fined $250 and sentenced to jail for a period of fifteen days.
136 N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1967, § 4, at 1, col. 6.
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of majority interests alone. Indeed, one of the essential goals of any legal system
is to insure that minority rights are respected. Furthermore, an approach to
any legal problem must be carried out on a realistic level. Valuable bargaining
techniques should not be denied under the obscure rationale of "public policy."
It is with these guidelines in mind that the legality of teacher strikes must be
examined.
To begin with, strikes by different classes of public employees do not have
the same effect on the public interest. It must be admitted that ". . a strike
by . . . teachers imparts far less danger to the community than a refusal of
policemen or firemen to report for work."' 37 Therefore, the first question that
presents itself is whether all governmental employee strikes should be indis-
criminately banned, or whether distinctions should be made by class within
the general category of "public employee." Certain classes of public employees
must always be denied the right to strike. This principle was recognized by the
court in South Bend Community School Corporation v. South Bend Federation
of Teachers where the bench asserted: "It is... obvious to all.., that prohibi-
tion against the right to strike must always prevail in certain instances, that is,
armed forces, police, fire and other security sections of governmental activity.'3
38
Teachers, however, certainly do not appear to fit into this "absolutely-
prohibited" category. Unlike police and firemen, teachers do not protect the
physical welfare of the community. Yet, on the other hand, their services are
definitely more essential than those of public golf course workers or gardeners
whose loss to the public through a strike would be minimal. Hence, as a class,
teachers fall into an "intermediate category.""
39
It is precisely because they are in a distinct category that teachers should
be differentiated from other municipal employees' 40 Not only are the services
they render different in nature from those performed by other classes, but their
qualifications are also separate and distinct. Therefore, instead of being indis-
criminately prohibited along with those of other municipal employees, teachers'
strikes should be judged on their own merits by their effect on the public interest.
Unfortunately, this does not always occur.
Rarely, if ever, are no-strike fiats by courts and legislatures preceded by an
investigation to determine whether a functional approach to the problem
is feasible or desirable. No attempt is made to determine the extent, if any,
-to which the denial of the strike is based on imagined fears or out-moded
doctrine, and the extent to which it is based on reality. There is a need
to delimit the services in which blanket restrictions on the strike are neces-
sary before such restrictions are imposed.
1 41
Having determined that a distinction must be made between different
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classes of public employees, the second question that must be answered is whether,
from a realistic viewpoint, prohibitions against teacher strikes are necessary.
As noted earlier, one of the reasons for denying school teachers the right to
strike is that governmental services may not be obstructed or impeded.1 2 Since
education is a function of the state, it must be acknowledged that a strike by
teachers does impede a governmental service. However, strikes by nongovern-
mental employees also obstruct public services and these strikes cannot be
enjoined. As one commentator has pointedly remarked: ".... there is not much
logic in permitting teamsters to close a school by not delivering coal to it but not
permitting teachers to close it by refusing to teach."' 43 If uninterrupted govern-
mental services are essential to society, it would appear that any strike that
impeded those services should be enjoinable. The fact that private employee
strikes which interrupt governmental services are not enjoinable lends credence
to the suspicion that strikes by school teachers are prohibited as a matter of
convenience rather than necessity. It is easier and less costly to bargain with
employees who do not possess the right to strike than with those who do. And
it is certainly more expedient to simply decree that teacher strikes are forbidden
than to cope with the problem of a legitimate strike.
The second reason put forth to deny teachers the right to strike is that such
action violates the authority of the government. 44 Once again, the given reason
offers no real answer to the problem presented. A court that enjoins a teacher
strike on the ground that it defies governmental authority is tendering a con-
clusion, not a reason. Every violation of a legislative prohibition is, in a sense,
a violation of governmental authority. To hold that teachers' strikes constitute
a violation of governmental authority does not answer the question why they
do so. The obvious answer is that the people, speaking through their elected
representatives, have made a value judgment to the effect that such strikes are
illegal because they adversely affect the body politic. The relevant inquiry then
becomes whether or not a majority of the people can rightfully deny a specific
form of concerted action to a minority group simply because it is convenient
and beneficial for the majority to do so. An important factor to consider is that
municipal governments are the major employers of teachers. Realistically,
teachers have to work for the government and will usually only strike when they
feel that the situation has become extreme.'45 By denying them the right to
strike, the majority is taking away their most valuable weapon at a time when
they need it the most.
The third claim presented is that suppression of public employee strikes
protects the public health and safety.'" While this may be a realistic argument
when applied to certain classes of public employees, such as police and firemen,
it becomes untenable when applied to teachers. Teacher strikes do not threaten
the community safety in the same manner as a strike by firemen, or the public
health in the same manner as a strike by employees of a community hospital.
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Since the immediate effect of a teacher walkout would be the closing of schools,
the only meaningful "public health and safety" argument is that the children's
education would be impaired by loss of classroom time. But schools are usually
closed for vacation periods such as Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Easter, not to
mention various other holidays. Yet when schools are closed by a teachers' strike,
the time lost suddenly becomes irretrievable. 4 Apart from the fact that there is
no necessary relation between the amount of time children spend in the class-
room and the amount they actually learn, 4 ' a more compelling reason exists
to support the conclusion that strikes by teachers should not be indiscriminately
proscribed as jeopardizing public health and safety. One expert in the field of
labor relations for teachers not only attacked the "health and safety" argument
but also made a thought-provoking plea for a realistic evaluation of teacher
strikes when he wrote:
It is hypocritical to argue that teachers must not be permitted to strike
because such strikes would endanger public safety or welfare while simul-
taneously supporting the right of other groups to strike in situations that
constitute a far more serious threat to public safety or welfare. Granted
that certain services must never be subject to strikes, only a preoccupation
with labels instead of social realities justifies the conclusion that all public
services belong in this category. The public-private dichotomy is not a
logical basis for deciding what groups should be permitted to strike. Some
strikes in the "private" sector constitute an extremely serious and immediate
threat to public welfare and safety; some strikes by public employees con-
stitute no such threat whatsoever. Like all strikes, those by teachers incon-
venience some people but they do not endanger the public welfare or
safety.1 49 (Emphasis added.)
It is suggested that this evaluation of the problem of teachers' strikes deserves
close examination. The present burgeoning militancy on the part of teacher
organizations together with the impotency of anti-strike fiats creates the need
for a new approach in the field of labor relations for teachers.
VI. Conclusion -A Limited Right to Strike for Teachers
Neither legislative nor judicial decrees have been successful in halting strikes
by public school teachers. When the traditional alternatives 50 to public employee
strikes fail, there is no practical method to prevent or terminate a teacher walk-
out. When a sizable segment of the community continues to ignore a specific
legislative mandate, as is the case in teachers' strikes, the law should be re-
examined and the reasons behind it should be the subject of careful scrutiny.
As discussed previously in this Note, the reasons given for the denial of
teachers' strikes are the same as those given for other classes of public employees.




150 See Note, supra note 141, at 560-69, where the author enumerates and discusses the
four primary alternatives to public employee strikes: political persuasion and pressure, media-
tion, binding arbitration, and fact-finding.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
There has been a failure in this area to make a realistic, pragmatic analysis of
the effects of a teachers' strike. Instead, the legislatures and the courts have be-
come "preoccupied with labels" and, having once decided that public employees
as a category should not have the right to strike, have proceeded to arbitrarily
ban all public employee strikes. This is a fundamental mistake. As Professor
Lieberman noted: "The public-private dichotomy is not a logical basis for
deciding what groups should be permitted to strike." 15'
The criterion that should be used to determine whether or not a particular
group should be allowed to strike is the effect of such a strike upon the commu-
nity. Strikes by public school teachers do not have the same effect as those by
other classes of public employees and therefore should not be treated as equiva-
lent. Because they are an intermediate class between essential and nonessential
public employees, teachers should be given a limited right to strike. This does
not mean that they should be allowed to violate their contracts and abandon
their posts in the middle of a school term. It does mean, however, that when
all bargaining procedures have failed, teachers should be permitted to strike
legally. While critics could contend that teachers already possess the ability to
exert equivalent pressure on school boards through the submission of individual
resignations, and hence the right to strike is unnecessary, this argument ignores
two basic considerations. First, all the teachers who did resign would be out of
a job; and second, even if the school board was forced to rehire them, such
resignations could mean the loss of tenure and valuable pension benefits. Both
these consequences make individual resignations an unacceptable and impractical
alternative for teachers.
The legislature can confer the ability to strike upon school teachers.'52
Just as the right to strike should not be indiscriminately forbidden, so too, the
same right should not be indiscriminately granted. Procedural prerequisites would
appear desirable. For example, teacher organizations could be required to
bargain collectively and submit to mediation and a fact-finding procedure before
being allowed to participate in a strike. Whatever procedural rules are estab-
lished, teachers should have a legal right to strike. Arguments to the effect that
this would enable teachers to force a school board into submission with the threat
of a prolonged strike are unrealistic. In the first place, strikes are only used by
teachers in extreme conditions. Secondly, because of the meager salaries they
already receive, teachers would be as anxious to settle the dispute as the school
board. Sweeping prohibitions that deny governmental employees the right to
strike are unrealistic, unworkable and illogical when applied to public school
teachers. By providing teachers with the right to strike, legislatures would be
discarding old myths in favor of new realities.
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